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Introduction
Despite  recent  traces  of  economic  growth,  Ethiopia  remains  one  of  the  poorest 
countries  in  the  world.  Though  about  80%  of  its  population  is  engaged  in  agriculture, 
agricultural productivity remains low and extremely vulnerable to climatic conditions.  The 
adoption and use of modern technologies is generally accepted as a potential vehicle out of 
poverty  for  many  but    adoption  rates  in  the  country  remain  low  with  the  nature  of  the 
adoption process largely unstudied (Spielman et al, 2007). This paper studies the impact of 
social  networks  in  the  technology  adoption  process  in  rural  Ethiopia. In  addition  to 
geographic networks, it considers the role played by other networks with more purposeful 
interactions such as a household’s friends. We also explore the differential impacts of social 
networks by network type, technology and the asset poverty status of households.
The longstanding effort to understand the persistence of poverty has exposed the 
complexity of its underlying structure and dynamics. While there is now a general consensus 
on the failure of canonical growth models to satisfactorily explain persistent chronic poverty, 
more complete models remain in development. Recent efforts have identified the role of 
various exclusionary mechanisms which prevent some households from escaping poverty and
explain the divergent poverty outcomes obtained by different groups. The struggle to 
understand why certain households or groups are excluded from economic growth remains an 
active area of research. The role of social networks in shaping consumption, production and 
exchange behavior is one area of current debate (Barrett, 2005).Relationships are important to the adoption and dissemination of modern technologies
in agrarian economies, and particularly in rural Ethiopia. Despite the general view that 
adoption and use of modern technologies (like  irrigation for producing  high value cash 
crops) could serve as a vehicle out of poverty for many, adoption rates in Ethiopia remain 
low (Spielman et al, 2007). Farmer adoption of modern techniques and innovation may be 
inhibited by lack of sufficient credit to acquire inputs and make necessary investments or due 
to limited access to input and output markets. Yet another potential deterrent to the adoption 
of new techniques is inadequate information on their practice. A common solution to this 
constraint has been the expansion of extension services, whose form and efficacy can depend 
on the nature of social learning as well formal instruction. While the effect of social networks 
in reducing the information constraint has been shown to exist, it is only recently that 
researchers have begun to study more how this effect occurs and to distinguish between 
effects after adoption and those causing adoption. (Munshi, 2004, Bandiera and Rasul, 2006).
Furthermore, very little research has been done to see if and how these network effects differ 
across households characterized by different forms and levels of poverty. In this light, this 
paper contributes to this research twofold: first by investigating the roles that social networks 
in household technology adoption in rural Ethiopia, and second by exploring the differential 
effect of networks across households at different levels of poverty and thus their potential to 
help households grow out of poverty. This study attempts to answer the following four 
questions: First, do networks contribute to technology adoption? Second, if networks affect 
technology adoption, what kinds of networks matter? Third, can we find evidence of social 
learning in network effects and fourth, are these network effects the same across households 
in different forms of poverty.Social Learning and Technology Adoption
The theory of social learning in technology adoption looks at how information 
intentionally or unintentionally made available to a farmer as a result of decisions of other 
farmers affects technology use. The fact that social networks affect technology diffusion has 
been studied widely. However only recently have researchers begun to study more how this 
effect occurs and to distinguish between effects after adoption and those causing adoption. 
Besley and Case (1994) present an early model of information externalities in the adoption 
and diffusion of improved cotton cultivars in the semi arid tropics. Foster and Rosenzweig
(1995) further develop this model in a study of high yielding varieties (HYVs) of wheat and 
rice in India during the Green Revolution. Munshi (2004) extends the analysis of Foster and 
Rosenzweig to show how social learning differs across heterogeneous populations. These 
studies distinguish between the effects of learning by doing and learning from others. They 
show how information constraints limit technology adoption and how own and neighbor 
experiences reduce this constraint.  
This research follows more recent studies to explore network effects and social 
learning prior to adoption. While several reasons for a positive relationship between an 
individual’s network and their probability of adopting a new technology exist, social learning 
theories indicate that the direction of this relationship between network size and adoption is 
ambiguous.  A larger network might indicate access to more information about a technology 
from the network and thus encourage adoption.  However, information from personal 
experience may be costly to acquire and the experience of others can substitute it.  Hence, a 
larger network could encourage households to delay adoption and free ride on the experience of members of their network. (Bardhan and Udry, 1999 ;Bandiera and Rasul,2006)
1. 
Furthermore, the effects of social networks could be heterogeneous depending on the kind of 
network as well as on the characteristics of farmers such as how informed they are generally 
and with respect to the technology.
Most previous studies focus on geographic proximity as the causal explanation for 
correlated adoption choices within social networks.  The geographic explanation assumes all 
farmers have unhindered access to the necessary information on the use of the new 
technology when it is used in their area. Thus, either neighbors willingly share information or 
farmers costlessly observe each other’s input use and output.  Brief discussions with rural 
farmers across Ethiopia reveal that this assumption is not necessarily true. With land 
allocated by government and passed on from generation to generation, farmers have little 
choice as to who their neighbors are and are not always on the best terms with them. 
Furthermore various procedures associated with a new technology such as quantity and 
application time of various inputs as well as timing of various management activities may not 
be casually observable but necessitate more purposeful interaction. 
Social networks based on characteristics other than physical proximity might be 
worth exploring in the bid to understand how information constraints could be reduced in 
rural Ethiopia. As evidence that adoption networks need not be based on physical proximity, 
studies like Slicher von Bath (1963) reveal that during the English agricultural revolution, it 
was not uncommon to see fields being cultivated with very old traditional techniques sharing 
boundaries with lands cultivated by newly introduced crop rotation.  More recently, Bandiera 
                                                  
1 This occurs because expected profit is increasing in both the information received from own trials as well as 
from trials from others in the network. Furthermore, the additional information gained from personal trials 
declines, the larger the network available for the farmer to learn from. This will be discussed further in the 
theoreticaframework . and Rasul (2006) find that farmer adoption decisions were correlated to the decisions of 
friends and family as well as those of the same religion but not for those in different 
religions. Similarly, in their study on technology adoption in Ghana, Conley and Udry (2001) 
find that farmers tend to have a limited number of incomplete technology information 
sources not necessarily based on geographic proximity. As far as we are aware, no such study 
has been conducted in rural Ethiopia. Given the importance of information in technology 
adoption and the numerous efforts to restructure and improve extension services in Ethiopia, 
it is important to understand the nature and quality of social learning among rural 
households.
Beyond the information externality offered by networks, there are other possible 
reasons why adoption choices could be related within various groups. As mentioned, but not 
fully explored, by Bandiera and Rasul (2006), decisions within groups could be correlated if 
there are other shared goals for, or constraints to the adoption decision, such as economies of 
scale in commercialization of a commodity.  For example, if there is risk sharing within 
networks or if the technology in question is too expensive for an individual farmer to buy and 
operate, one might expect a high degree of correlation of adoption among group members. 
Similarly, group effects and dynamics could reduce the willingness of individual farmers to 
engage in new activities.
Thus this paper studies the effect of a household’s network of neighbors and friends 
on their technology adoption decisions with a view to distinguishing between social learning 
and other peer effects. Finding an inverse “u” relationship between the probability of 
adoption and the number of adopters in a households-information network as in Bandiera and 
Rasul (2006) will reveal social learning and thus the potential for using certain groups as a vehicle to disseminate information of new technologies. While finding a strictly linear or “u” 
relationship could indicate the presence of social learning, such a result could also be 
explained by other network effects. For example, a “u” shape might indicate a threshold 
effect where a smaller network with shared risks reduces incentive to adopt but as this risk
sharing group gets larger, the high cost of failure is mitigated, thus encouraging adoption. A 
linear relation shop could suggest benefits of pooling resources to reduce unit costs.  Thus,
findings may suggest whether networks have an impact and whether that impact is through 
social learning. Furthermore, identification of differential network effects across poverty 
classes will also inform the planning and design of extension as well as other poverty
reduction strategies in rural Ethiopia.
Even if social networks encourage technology adoption, it is important to understand 
if and how their effects differ across households characterized by different poverty forms and 
dynamics. Previous work has indicated that reducing formal credit constraints tends to have
no effect on the use of modern technology for the persistently asset poor though the use of 
certain technologies, like fertilizer, assists in their ability to accumulate assets over time
(Liverpool and Winter-Nelson, 2009). Thus exploring whether reducing information
constraints through social learning has a positive effect on the use of these technologies by
persistently poor could indicate its role as a potential vehicle out of persistent poverty. 
Social learning is often measured using a target input model or a profitability model. 
The target input model lays emphasis on the farmer’s problem of deciphering the optimal 
Theoretical Framework
Social Learningmanagement of a new technology. This approach contrasts with other models of social 
learning like Besley and Case (1993;1994) and Ellison and Fudenberg (1993) which focus on 
the problem of determining the true profitability of a new technology from personal and  
network experience. This study adopts the target input model to focus on the role that 
networks play in learning when new crops or technologies are introduced and the evidence of 
learning about the best use of inputs from others (Foster and Rosenzweig,1995). Secondly, it 
can be shown that unlike in the case of uncertain but exogenous profits, the profitability of 
any new technology grows over time as knowledge accumulates. Thus, as pointed out by 
Foster and Rosenzweig (1995), we can test for learning externalities directly by looking at 
productivity. Increasing profitability with increased knowledge accumulation implies that 
technology adoption is an absorbing state. The above assumption appears more appropriate 
in our context than the assumption of complete learning about the technology needed for 
identification as made by Besley and Case (1994, page 17). Also, ultimately, the reduced 
forms that emerge from both theoretic models capture farmers learning by doing and learning 
from others. 
The target input model
2 developed here follows that of Bardhan and Udry (1999) as 
well as Bandiera and Rasul(2006). It assumes that farmers use Bayesian updating to learn 
about the parameters of a new technology. While farmers are aware of the underlying 
production technology, they are unaware of one parameter, i.e the target input level. 
The target input model assumes that farmers output in time  ;  , declines in the 
square of the distance between the input used  , and the unknown input target,   
                                                  
2 The target input model is a longstanding model which has been developed by Prescott(1972), Wilson (1975), 
Jovanovic and Nyarko(1994) and applied with regards to learning in agriculture by Foster and 
Rosenzwig(1995).
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Though the target input level  is not known at time , after the farmer has selected 
his input level  and sees his yield, he updates his belief about what the target input is. 
Each time the farmer makes a selection of  and gets a particular yield is a trial after which 
he is provided more information about the distribution of . Thus farmers learn by doing. 
Because of farmer and time specific effects, the optimal target for farmer  fluctuates
around 
* is defined as:
* (1.2)
Where  refers to these transitory farmer specific shocks to the optimal target input
*.  The error is assumed to be independently and identically distributed normal with E( ) 
=0 and V( ) =
2 . 
At any time , farmer  believes 
* ~ (
*,
2 ). The model assumes that 
2 is 
known and also that the input is costless so that farmer’s profit is just price (normalized to 1) 
multiplied by . 
Since Et( ) =0, to maximize his expected profit, farmer  uses his expected optimal 
target level as his new level of inputs. Thus, =E( )=
* and expected output is
Et( ) = 1 - Et [ -Et( )]
2 = 1 -
2 -
2 (1.3)
showing that output increases with lower levels of uncertainty about target input  .
With regard to learning by doing, in each period, farmer  engages in a trial with a 
certain level of target input , sees the output after which he modifies his belief about the 
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Where  is the number of trials farmer   has had with the new technology on his 
own farm between periods 0 and .  Substituting (1.5) into (1.3) we can express current 
expected profits
3 as:





From equation (1.6), we can see that output increases with the number of trials, i.e.
1
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+ +Now, consider the case where a farmer can improve his estimate of the target input by 
learning from the trials of other farmers.  If we define the network of farmers who share 
information as ) ( and assume that farmers in this network costlessly share
information, then after each period, farmer  updates his belief about the target input with not 
only information from his previous trials, but also from those of other network members 
. This means that at time  where farmer  has had  1 trials and the network  ) ( 1
trials, his posterior belief about the variance of  
* will be
2 =
1 1 ) (
1
            (1.8)
with expected output now being
Et[ , 1 ) ( ] = 1-
1 1 ) (
1 -
2 (1.9)
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Given the existence of some available traditional technology (traditional crop or 
variety), with a known return of qT a farmer is faced with the decision to adopt a new 
technology or not. Let the adoption of new technology by farmer “i” in time “t” be a 
dichotomous variable, such that  =1 if adoption occurs and 0 otherwise. If learning takes 
place as suggested in the previous section, farmer i’s adoption depends on the adoption 
                                                  
4 It can be inferred under this assumptions that the larger the network size, the larger the number of trials 
available for farmer i from the network.
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The technology adoption decisiondecision of others in his network. The value of future streams of profits to farmer i from 
period “t” to “T” is:
Vt ] ) ( , [ 1 1 =  max
} 1 , 0 {
Et ]} ) ( , [ ) 1 { 1 1 ]   (2.1)
=  max
} 1 , 0 {
] ) ( , [ ] ) ( , [ ) 1 ( 1 1 1 ]   (2.2)
Where 
0 1 is the total number of trials that farmer i has conducted up to and 
including period s.  and  1 ) ( refers to the number of trials that farmer i’s network has had 
over the same period. d is the discount rate.
From equations 2.1 and 2.2, we can see that technology adoption by farmer  depends 
on his expectation of current profits as well as the future expected profitability of adoption. 
Expected profits are increasing in the number of trials of the new technology.  Thus, the 
number of trials positively affects expected profit which determines technology adoption. 
Furthermore, the fact that expected profits increase with the number of trials indicates that 
technology adoption is an absorbing state. While several studies have revealed examples of 
innovations that are attempted and abandoned once proven less profitable than alternative 
technologies, this would tend to occur in places where new technology has not been tested 
for contextual appropriateness before introduction. Based on information in the survey areas, 
we feel safe to assume that the new crops and varieties explored in this study have generally 
proven to be superior to the traditional crops on average once appropriate complementary 
inputs and practices are also adopted; these being the unknown in this process. Issues of 
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dEquations 2.1 and 2.2 allow the possibility that  adoption in time “t” might occur even 
if the technology is less profitable than the traditional practice in that particular period, as 
long as the  benefit in the future from an additional period of personal trial and/or the trials of 
others in time “t” is sufficiently large. If the loss in current expected profits is less than the 
discounted gain in future profitability from the additional trial of the new technology, then 
the technology will be adopted in time “t” even if the current profitability is less than the 
traditional variety. This result obtains if the right hand side of the following equation:
] ) ( ), ( ) ( ), 1 ( [ ) ) ( , ( 1 1      (2.3)
is greater than zero; 
1




) ( ) 1 (
1
1 0 0 0 0 0          (2.4)
Where  )] ( ) 1 ( [ 1 1 refers to the difference in value functions if adoption 
occurred in  time t+1 when farmer  has had  trials and  value function estimated in time t+1 
where farmer has had  (one less) trials.
The right hand side of equation 2.4 is positive, reflecting the increase in the expected 
profits due to the information gotten by the farmer from experimenting in time  . However, 
while the entire value on the RHS is positive, it is decreasing in  If information from 
personal trials and the trials of others are substitutes, then as more other farmers use the new 
technology, less addition information is gained by the individual farmer’s own
experimenting. Thus if many of farmer  s neighbors or associates have characteristics that 
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dwould lead them to adopt a new technology early, it might be in  ’s best interest to refrain 
from experimenting until she has seen how others have done with the new technology. (Udry 
and Bardhan, 1999).  These opposing effects can be seen by taking the derivative of 2.5 
which reflects the necessary condition for a farmer to adopt the new technology(crop) in time 
t, based on 2.3.
] ) ( ), ( [ ]) ) ( , 1 ( [ ] ) ( , [ 1 1      (2.5)
which is
) (
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The first term in equation 2.7 indicates the positive effect of learning from the 
network though it is decreasing in  ) ( . However, given that information from personal 
trials and one’s network are substitutes, the larger a farmers network of adopters, the lower 
the value of additional information from personal trial is, creating an incentive for the farmer 
to strategically delay adoption. This can be seen by the negative sign of the second part of 
equation (2.7). The sign of the overall equation depends on which value dominates and 
consequently the net gains from adoption in time “t” can be an increasing or decreasing 
function of the number of adopters in a farmer’s network. Bandiera and Rasul explain the 
sign of this relationship as an indication of myopia amongst farmers with the more myopic 
i
t t T t t t t t i n t V q i n t V i n t q E
t




i n t V i n t V
i n





t s t i t io
s
i n s i n s
t i n

























d dfarmers being less likely to delay strategically (hence positive sign of net gains) and vice 
versa for the less myopic farmers.
It is also important to note from equation 2.7 that the net gains to adoption in time “t” 
is also a decreasing function of the accuracy of farmer  ’s initial information about the 
technology. The more accurate his own personal information, the less important the 
additional information from the network will be, and the less sensitive he is likely to be to the 
number of adopters in his network.  Also, given that the effect of network size  on 
adoption  is positive, but decreasing in the size of the network, tests for a non-linear 
relationship between adoption and network size can provide evidence of social learning.
We have shown via the social learning model that farmers learn from their experience 
as well as the experience of others in their networks.  This information increases the 
profitability of the technology. The more trials (and consequently information) farmer i has 
had access to (from the number of adopters in his network) at time t, the more profitable 
technology i is to him. We have also shown that adoption of a new technology for any farmer 
is a function of the value of current and future streams of profits (given adoption) for that 
farmer. Given that profitability is an increasing function of information and that information 
from one’s own trial and the trials of his network are substitutes, we have shown that while 
the direction of the association is not certain, the decision to adopt a technology at any point 
in time will depend to some extent on the size of his network. The relationships can be 
measured empirically through estimation of:
i
n(i)
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where  is the adoption of technology k by household  where household i belongs to 
poverty status class    refers to a vector of exogenous variables capturing household  s 
demographic characteristics, as well as  other factors that affect a household’s decision to 
adopt a particular technology. This includes, household size, sex of household head, age of 
household head,  highest years of education in the household, distance to the nearest market, 
size of land cultivated by household(in hectares),value of  household implements, number of 
household members engaged in full time agricultural activities.  is a dummy to account for 
unobserved variations across villages that could affect a household’s technology use 
decision.   captures the social network effects and  is the error term capturing 
unobserved individual and network characteristics which affect household participation. In 
the model, the social network variable is measured as the reported number of adopters among 
the farmer’s social network, at the time of adoption. The networks explored are friends and 
neighbors. Various specification for  are explored. The main ones are a quadratic 
function to test for the direction of the relationship between network size and probability of 
adoption. The other two approaches are the use of splines to explore possible threshold 
effects in the size of various networks and non parametric estimations to confirm the results 
of other specifications. 
As in the traditional latent variable analysis,  represents the household’s present 
value of net gains from participating in agricultural innovation at time  .
While we cannot see the net present value ascribed by each household, we do observe their 
dichotomous decision to use a modern technology or not. TAikvt  =1 if  TAikvt
* >0    
TAikvt
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and
=0 otherwise
we assume that   = F(
assuming symmetry of the function describing F() around zero and where we 
explore various specifications for f[ ].
As discussed earlier, social networks are expected to have an effect on technology adoption,
but the nature of this relationship is not immediately obvious. Thus in the first model 
specification, we include the squared network effects as another variable to test for a 
quadratic polynomial fit and the “u” or “inverse u” shape.
= F[(a )
x +  ( Z )
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Then we also explore possible threshold  effect in network size testing the 
differential effect of having a network size of (1-4),(5-8) and 8+ members in the network 
engaged in a particular technology at the time of  adoption relative to having no one  in the
network using the technology.
Where [0], [1], [2] and [3] reflect different splines
This study uses a subset of the Ethiopia Rural Household Survey (ERHS) dataset and 
additional data collected from two ERHS villages. The ERHS dataset contains detailed 
information on consumption expenditure, assets and agricultural activities of rural Ethiopian 
households and is the product of a longstanding data collection effort by Oxford University, 
the University of Addis Ababa, and the International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI). 
l y
l y
DataIt started in 1989, when a survey team visited seven peasant associations in Central and 
Southern Ethiopia. In 1994, the survey expanded to 15 peasant associations (PAs) across four 
regions, yielding a sample of 1477 households. Additional rounds were conducted in late 
1994, 1995, 1997, 1999 and 2004. 
During 2007, supplementary community level surveys were administered in all 15 PAs to 
identify recent changes in the villages, particularly between 2004 and 2007.  Supplemental 
household surveys were also administered in 2 out of the 15 PAs. These 2 villages, Haresawe 
and Korodegaga, were selected based on local information and community level surveys that 
indicated that innovative technologies had been introduced in these regions. Data on adoption 
of improved technologies including improved varieties of various cereals and irrigated 
vegetables were collected from 186 households in these two PAs. Demographic information 
as well as information on their assets, access to various institutions, social networks and the 
prevalence of technology adoption within these networks were also collected. Other data are 
based on the previously collected data from the 6 rounds of the survey conducted between 
1994 and 2004.
The 2 main technologies explored here are improved cereals and irrigated vegetables and 
pulses. While these technologies are not brand new, discussions with farmers and 
development agents indicated that there has been a recent emphasis on the production of high 
value crops such as fruits and vegetables as well as other marketable crops like pulses and 
improved cereals. As a control for new technologies, we explore the social network effects in 
a relatively old technology (chemical fertilizer) on recent adopters.  Social learning is not 
expected to affect adoption of this older technology. In Harresawe, the farmers and the 
development agent cited 2004/2005 as the period of major shift in the village in terms of increased focus on field pea production and 2004 as a year for increased vegetable 
production.  For irrigation of pulses, fruits and vegetables, we restricted the analysis to 
households who had adopted irrigation since 2004.
5 Ninety two percent (92%) of these 
households were engaged in irrigating fruits, vegetables, pulses or oil seed in 2007.
This study explicitly distinguishes among households by their asset poverty status to 
discern differential effects of social networks on the probability of farmers adopting 
technology. This analysis begins by using the complete ERHS dataset to classify households 
by their asset poverty status.  The asset based approach to poverty measurement classifies as 
asset poor asset those households whose assets are inadequate to generate an income stream 
supporting consumption above the expenditures poverty line (Carter and Barrett, 2006).  An 
asset poverty line is defined as the asset value that exactly supports consumption at the 
expenditures poverty line.  In this application an asset index is established as a function of 
the household’s land, livestock, farm implements, other physical assets, and education.  The 
weights on each component of the asset index are based on an estimate of the relationship 
between assets and consumption as described in appendix A.  Households whose asset index 
was below the asset poverty line in each survey year are classified as “always asset poor”. 
“Never asset poor” households are those whose asset index was above the poverty line each 
year, and households whose status changed between years are classified as “Transitory asset 
poor”. Because very few households in the two villages were in the never asset poor 
category, the analysis distinguishes only between households who were persistently asset 
poor (considered to be in a poverty trap) and those who were not. 
                                                  
5 Though some aspects of irrigation such as personal digging of wells, setting up water harvesting ponds and 
setting up of small scale drip irrigation have been  recently introduced on a wider scale.Tables 1(a) to 1(c) describe network sizes for adopters and not adopters across networks 
and across poverty classes for the technologies considered. The results show that on average, 
adopters of improved seed had more friends who had previously adopted than had not 
adopted. However, the mean number of neighbors who had adopted earlier is higher for non 
adopters than for adopters. With regard to poverty status, adopters in poverty traps had fewer 
adopters in their network than persistently poor non adopters. In contrast those adopters who 
were not in a poverty trap had more adopters among their friends, but fewer among their 
neighbors than non-poor non-adopters.  Compared to those in poverty, the non-poor have 
more adopters in their networks of friends but not in their networks of neighbors. For 
neighbors, we find larger number of adopters in the network of non adopters compared to 
adopters  across both poverty categories, though the difference in means is much higher 
amongst those not in a poverty trap. This suggests that learning from networks may not be 
defined by space but rather by other interests.
With regards to irrigated crop we find a higher mean of adopters in both the friend and 
neighbor network among adopters rather than non-adopters though the difference in mean 
adopters is higher within the friend network than in the neighbor network. While the mean 
adopters in the network of non-adopters is similar across poverty status, adopters of irrigated 
crops amongst households in a poverty trap are significantly higher than those not in a 
poverty trap; 8 vs 5. Fertilizer, like irrigated crops reveals more adopters in the network of 
adopters compared to non-adopters. Thus tables 1a – 1c appear to indicate the presence of 
some sort of network effects, possibly different across network types and poverty status.
The descriptive statistics in table 2 reveal the relatively poor nature of our sample. 
Households tend to cultivate about 2 hectares of land, be headed by middle aged men of about 50 years old and have on average someone with a maximum of about 5 years of 
education. Their assets tend to comprise of 1 or 2 head of livestock valued at about 400EB
6
with households in poverty trap tending to have lower assets, more people engaged in full 
time farming and less accessibility to markets.
Given the binary nature of the adoption variable, we explore probit, logit and linear 
probability models. In the case of recently adopted improved varieties of cereals, we find 
evidence of social learning that varies by network type. As can be seen from table 3 below, 
the probability of adopting improved seeds exhibits the inverse “u” relationship with respect 
to the number of friends who had previously adopted improved seed use. While the marginal 
effects on the level term are positive and significant, the marginal effects on the squared term 
are negative and significant. On the other hand the neighbor network tends to have an
insignificant effect on the odds of adoption.  We also find that younger households and 
households cultivating larger landholdings are more likely to adopt the improved seed.  The 
closer the household is to a paved road, the more likely they are to adopt. We differentiate 
between the closest market used (usually the local peasant association market) and access to 
other markets which is an indicator of more commercialization opportunities.
Next we test to see if this behavior differs by poverty status. Results (shown in table 
4) indicate that evidence of social learning still exists but varies across both network and
poverty status. While the effect of friends continues to exhibit the inverse “u” relationship for 
                                                  
6 One US dollar is equivalent to about 11 Ethiopian Birr (EB). The PPP conversion factor is approximately 
0.25.
Estimation Results:
Improved Cerealsthe households not in the poverty trap, the effect is not statistically different from zero for 
those households in a poverty trap. This indicates that there are differential social learning 
effects not only across network types but also across poverty levels. It appears that while the
level variable for the number of neighbors who have adopted has no effect on the odds of 
adoption for all households, the squared term is positive for the households in a poverty trap, 
though only significant beyond 10% in the logit estimation. This difference across poverty 
levels may reflect different kinds of networks or efficacy of  networks by poverty class.
Where network members are less knowledgeable or information transfer is less efficient, a
larger number of informants is needed for adequate information to trigger adoption and the 
promise of gaining information from the network is less likely to deter own experimentation. 
Poor households may be more likely to be in such networks.  Alternatively, the different 
results by poverty class could also indicate other network effects such as economies of scale 
if indeed these are crops for commercialization. Since the neighbor effect is not statistically 
significantly different across poverty status, such an explanation might be feasible for 
households likely to commercialize
Next we explore the same model for irrigation of pulses and vegetables. Considering 
the adoption procedure for recent adopters (from 2004), again we find that network effects 
for friends who had previously adopted exhibits the inverse u relationship but this is not 
evident for neighbors who have already adopted. Considering the separate effects of the 
various networks only the effect of friends is significant, still exhibiting the inverse u 
relationship indicating social learning. Coefficient values suggest increasing probability of 
Irrigated fruits, vegetables and pulsesadoption up to about 10 friends, and then reversal in the effect.  To validate these results, we 
attempt non-parametric estimation of the effects of these networks. Figures 1 and 2 show that 
while the friends network seems to exhibit the inverse u relationship, the neighbor network 
effect appears to be more of an increasing function of the network size. While there are some 
network effects of neighbors, social learning is more evident in networks where there is more 
intentional interaction. Other factors that appear to affect adoption of irrigated crops are 
access to commercialization opportunities, households wealth captured by non productive 
assets including jewelry and other household items. 
Again we test for a differential effect of the friend’s network across poverty class. 
From table 6, we find that households with more non productive assets, better access to 
external markets and larger cultivated land size are more likely to adopt irrigated crops. We 
find that though a network effect of friends is present, it does not clearly reveal the inverse u 
relationship and does not appear to be statistically significantly different across poverty 
classes
7. However, the small sample size may be responsible for low levels of statistical 
significance. 
Thus we further explore any difference across poverty status by a non parametric 
estimation. The non parametric estimates in figures 3 and 4 confirm that there are similar 
effects of a household’s network of friends who had previously adopted irrigated crops on 
their probability of adoption across households in different poverty categories. The results 
reveal an inverse u relationship between network size and probability of adoption, that may 
have been obscured in the parametric estimation due to the small sample size. 
                                                  
7 Given our small sample size Just to confirm these results, we explore more parsimonious specifications such  
as dropping the non productive asset measure given that this might be correlated with poverty status. This does 
not change the results Furthermore the correlation coefficient between various variables indicates that we do not 
have a problem with multicollinearity.Given the weakness of the results in table 6, we test for a threshold effect on the 
friends’ network by introducing splines. Table 7 shows the marginal effects of various factors 
on the adoption of irrigated crops
8. The results reveal that compared to households who have 
no friends who have adopted irrigated crops, households with between 1 and 4 friends who 
had adopted have a 40% higher probability of adopting irrigated crops. For those with 
between 5 and 8 friends are  about 67% more likely to adopt the technology and while having 
more than 8 friends using a technology are less likely than those with 5 and 8 to adopt, they 
are 62% more likely than those who have no friends using a technology. This further 
indicates that the relationship between the size of the friend network and probability of 
adoption is shaped as an inverse u. A test on the equality of coefficient reveals that the 
coefficient on 1-4 friend adopters is statistically significantly different from having 5-8 
members at 1%, and while we fail to reject that having 1-4 is statistically significantly 
different from having more than 8 members we also fail to reject that having 5-8 is 
statistically significantly different from having more than 8 members.
Next we explore the results for fertilizer. Since fertilizer is an old technology, we do 
not expect to find strong evidence of social learning, but network effects could still exist. We 
explore the factors likely to determine fertilizer adoption among households who have 
adopted fertilizer since 2004. We find that households who had recently begun to grow 
pulses and oil seed, improved seeds and vegetables were more likely to be recent adopters of
fertilizer use. Wealthier households and households with more educated members were also 
more likely to be recent fertilizer adopters. When the size of different networks was 
                                                  
8 As expected, the logit and probit results are consistently the same across this analysis. However, we decided to 
use the marginal effects here to ease the interpretation of the network effect of the spline results.
Fertilizerconsidered separately, we find evidence of network effects among friends only. The results in 
columns 5-7 in table 8 show that there appears to be a strictly increasing relationship between 
number of adopters in a households group of friends who had previously been using fertilizer 
and their likelihood of adopting fertilizer use for recent fertilizer adopters. This seems to 
indicate some network effects exist, but not necessarily social learning. Increasing returns to 
the number of adopters of fertilizer use might be indicate economies of scale effects of a 
household’s network. Given that the use of fertilizer is strongly associated with commercial 
crop production, it makes sense that scale effects in coordinating input procurement and 
output sale might be present.
Finally we explore the differential effect across poverty classes.  The main 
conclusions from table 9 is that social network effects though weaker still appear to exhibit 
increasing returns to scale, but only for those households who are not in a poverty trap. For 
those in a poverty trap, it appears that social network effects are not statistically significantly 
different from zero. We find evidence of some network effect exclusion for the persistently 
poor households though we cannot identify the mechanism through which this exclusion 
occurs. This is worrisome if those households in a poverty trap are not able to take advantage 
of network effects such as coordination in the procurement of inputs or marketing of outputs 
necessary for their adoption of yield enhancing technologies. However, this highlights 
possible differences between the type of networks that households in a poverty trap use 
compared to those not in poverty trap as well as their reasons for the use of fertilizer. If these 
poor households are using fertilizer to increase production to improve productivity and not 
necessarily for commercialization, it might make sense that network effects supporting 
commercialization opportunities might not be necessary. However, if there are input procurement benefits to network members, this lack of significance implies that the poorest 
households are excluded from such opportunities with more severe consequences.  
This paper explored the role of social networks on adoption of new technologies in 
rural Ethiopia. It found evidence of social learning, though this differs across network types 
and with poverty status. For modern technologies most recently introduced into the villages
studied (improved cereals), we find evidence of social learning, that operates through the
network of friends among households not in a poverty trap. We find that networks of 
neighbors who have adopted is only significant for households in a poverty trap and even 
there, it is only at very large network sizes that the neighbor network is positively associated 
with adoption of improved seed  
For recently adopted irrigated vegetables, pulses and oil seeds, we still find evidence 
of social learning and encouragingly this is not statistically significantly different across 
poverty class. However, again we find evidence that social learning occurs across networks 
for which there is more purposeful interaction rather than that provided by geographical 
proximity.  For a well known technology, fertilizer, we find evidence of network effects but 
not social learning. Again we find that network effects differ by poverty status, with 
networks unfortunately not affecting fertilizer adoption for the poorest households.
The finding that social learning effects are available in rural Ethiopia is and that they 
emerge through purposeful interaction rather than proximity is significant for extension 
planning.  Technology diffusion is likely to be enhanced if extension can reach more 
networks of interest.  This implies a need to target intentional groups of rural people rather 
than spatial clusters. Identifying such groups presents a challenge to extension services.
Conclusions:One mechanism for targeting groups might be local  . are traditional 
community based insurance schemes to which households  periodically contribute a 
predetermined amount of money to serve as insurance in the event of death of a member of 
the family or other shock like health related adversities. Though  arrangements are 
informal, they are well coordinated and organized with long life spans and relatively high 
levels of trust amongst members. This organization already plays multiple roles in the rural 
environment, and might be a conduit for social learning that extension services could 
employ. Our preliminary results indicate the presence of social learning effects in  but 
due to multicollinearity between the  network adopters variable and friends network, we 





Table 1a. Mean number of network members already using improved seed  by 
network type for recent adopters of improved seed 






Table 1b. Mean number of network members already practicing irrigation by network 
type for recent adopters of irrigated crops 
Network 


















4.959 5.662 4.195 4.348 7.467 6.949 2.295
(10.30) (11.02) (9.47) (7.25) (13.95) (14.45) (4.74)
5.263 3.135 7.573 3.000 6.929 2.769 5.933
(12.56) (4.63) (7.24) (4.99) (14.44) (3.48) (10.64)
171 89 82 76 84
(Standard deviation in parenthesis)
4.706 6.612 2.251 8.136 2.346 5.276 2.409
(7.747) (9.505) (3.290 (11.121) (2.629) (7.559) (3.761)
2.997 3.926 1.845 4.459 1.683 3.450 2.115
(3.975) (4.455) (2.925) (4.893) (2.262) (4.028) (3.346)
167 94 73 27 47 36 45
(Standard deviation in parenthesis)Table 1c. Mean number of network members already using fertilizer by network type 
for recent adopters of fertilizer




Table 2. Descriptive statistics
Descriptive Statistics















6.013 7.846 4.981 7.586 5.091 8.080 4.467
(7.182) (9.789) (5.403) (11.364) (4.689) (8.563) (5.344)
5.737 6.286 4.334 7.856 5.544 5.561 4.966
(8.177) (9.143) (6.754) (10.877) (6.052) (3.528) 6.059)
172 58 92 25 34 30 42
(Standard deviation in parenthesis)
MaleHead(1/0) 0.581 0.539 0.553
Household Livestock(Ethiopian Birr) 462.89 403.05 410.36
Household Non Productive assets 
(Ethiopian birr) 406.65 363.255 411.60
Agehead (years) 49.700 50.565 48.09
Distance to closest market(Km) 4.471 14.88 11.87
Distance to paved road(km)  13.179 5.090 3.94
Household Land Cultivated (hectares) 2.053 2.947 2.814
Fulltime Farm Labor (Number) 2.064 2.237 1.917
Most Education(years) 5.102 5.123 5.356
Number of observations 160 76 84









(3.19) (3.29) (3.09)Table 3: Social Network effect on the adoption of improved cereals






MaleHead(1/0) 0.956 0.933 -0.034 -0.0113 0.910
Household Livestock 0.999 0.286 0.000 0.0000 0.293
Household NonProductive 
assets 0.999 0.902 0.000 0.0000 0.884
Agehead (years) 0.967* 0.082 -0.019* -0.0062 0.078
Distance to closest 
market(Km) 0.9858 0.758 -0.009 -0.0030 0.717
Distance to paved road(km)  1.0054 0.737 0.003 0.0009 0.763
Household Land Cultivated  1.099* 0.104   0.059 0.0198 0.110
Fulltime Farm Labor 
(Number) 0.9709 0.880 -0.019 -0.0064 0.868
Most Education(years) 1.0172 0.811 0.006 0.0021 0.869
Friend Network size 1.0984** 0.028     0.051** 0.0170 0.024
Friend Network size Squared 0.9980** 0.030    -0.001** -0.0001 0.031
Neighbor network size 0.9398 0.576 -0.031 -0.0104 0.648
Neighbor network size 
squared 0.9983 0.673 -0.001 -0.0004 0.671
Harresawe 0.0411*** 0.000 -1.883*** 0.579 0.000
Number of Observations 150 150
Prob > chi2 0.0000 0.0000
Pseudo R2 0.3598 0.3588
*=significant at 10%  **=significant at 5%  ***significant at1%Table 4. Social Network effects estimation by poverty status
Logit estimation  






MaleHead(1/0) 1.0472 0.936 0.0137 0.0011 0.963
Household Livestock 0.9999 0.486 -0.0001 0.0000 0.512
Household NonProductive assets 0.9998 0.770 -0.0001 0.0000 0.745
Agehead (years) 0.9628* 0.077 -0.0220* -0.0018 0.049
Distance to closest market(Km) 0.9906 0.868 -0.0086 -0.0007 0.758
Distance to paved road(km)  0.9973 0.892 -0.0029 -0.0002 0.794
Household Land Cultivated  1.1203 0.159 0.0664 0.0055 0.115
Fulltime Farm Labor (Number) 0.9594 0.845 -0.0271 -0.0022 0.822
Most Education(years) 0.9974 0.972 -0.0057 -0.0005 0.886
Not in a poverty trap 0.9433 0.923 -0.0559 -0.0046 0.866
Friends*PovTrap 0.7172 0.144 -0.1907 -0.0157 0.130
Friends*PovertyTrapSquared 1.015* 0.082 0.0088* 0.0007 0.083
Friends*NonPovertyTrap 1.538* 0.102 0.2456* 0.0202 0.078
Friends*NonPovertyTrapSquared 0.985* 0.079 -0.009* -0.0007 0.078
Nighbors*PovertyTrap 1.2046 0.197 0.1099 0.0090 0.284
Neighbors*PovertyTrapSquared 1.000** 0.036 0.1403 0.0004 0.130
Neighbors*Non PovertyTrap 0.7766 0.337 -0.0046 -0.0115 0.350
Neighbors*NonPovertyTrapSquared 1.0031 0.782 0.0018 0.0002 0.774
Harresawe 0.050*** 0.001 -1.7623*** -0.1810 0.000
Number of Observations 138 138
Prob > chi2 0.0000 0.0000
Pseudo R2 0.379 0.3793
*=significant at 10%  **=significant at 5%  ***significant at1%Table 5: Social Network effect  on the adoption of irrigated crops 
Logit estimation  






MaleHead(1/0) 0.472 0.418 -0.530 -0.147 0.295
Household Livestock 1.000 0.163 0.000 0.000 0.202
Household NonProductive 
assets
    
1.002*** 0.004 0.001*** 0.000 0.005
Agehead (years) 1.021 0.417 0.015 0.004 0.309
Distance to closest 
market(Km) 1.038 0.632 0.026 0.007 0.497
Distance to paved road(km)  0.929*** 0.006 -0.036*** -0.010 0.001
Household Land Cultivated  1.461*** 0.000 0.215*** 0.060 0.000
Fulltime Farm Labor (Number) 1.773 0.157 0.259 0.072 0.214
Most Education(years) 1.124 0.363 0.039 0.011 0.498
Friend Network size 2.718***. 0.011 0.578*** 0.160 0.002
Friend Network size Squared 0.924** 0.015 -0.046*** -0.013 0.006
Neighbor network size 1.289 0.298 0.149 0.041 0.275
Neighbor network size squared 0.990 0.433 -0.006 -0.002 0.466
P1 55.78*** 0.007 2.3113*** 0.466 0.001
Number of Observations 85 85.000
Prob > chi2 0.03 0.000
Pseudo R2 0.3625 0.3548
*=significant at 10%  **=significant at 5%  ***significant at1%Table 6: Social network effects on the adoption of irrigated crops
Logit estimation  






MaleHead(1/0) 0.4718 0.418 -0.3970 -0.0907 0.417
Household Livestock 1.0001 0.163 0.0001 0.0000 0.116
Household NonProductive 
assets 1.0016*** 0.004 0.0009*** 0.0002 0.004
Agehead (years) 1.0209 0.417 0.0131 0.0030 0.346
Distance to closest 
market(Km) 1.0380 0.632 0.0251 0.0057 0.526
Distance to paved road(km)  0.9293*** 0.006 -0.0408*** -0.0093 0.003
Household Land Cultivated  1.4610*** 0.000 0.2229*** 0.0509 0.000
Fulltime Farm Labor 
(Number) 1.7728 0.157 0.3441 0.0786 0.127
Most Education(years) 1.1241 0.363 0.0572 0.0131 0.395
Not in a poverty trap 0.2182 0.153 -0.8171 -0.2075 0.154
Friends*PovTrap 2.6162** 0.039 0.5597*** 0.1279 0.031
Friends*PovertyTrapSquared 0.9445 0.267 -0.0338 0.0442 0.239
Friends*NonPovertyTrap 1.4984 0.530 0.1935 -0.0077 0.596
Nighbors*PovertyTrap 0.9460 0.457 -0.0282 -0.0064 0.498
P1 103.68*** 0.003 2.618*** 0.446 0.001
Number of Observations 79 79
Prob > chi2 0.03 0
Pseudo R2 0.3625 0.3644
*=significant at 10%  **=significant at 5%  ***significant at1%Table 7: Social network effects by splines on the adoption of  irrigated crops
Irrigated Crop
     Marginal    
      effects
     Robust 
standard error P>z
MaleHead(1/0) -0.139 0.136 0.312
Household Livestock 0.000 0.000 0.182
Household NonProductive 
assets 0.0002 0.000 0.004
Agehead (years) 0.0052 0.004 0.186
Distance to closest 
market(Km) 0.004 0.010 0.706
Distance to paved road(km)  -0.010 0.003 0.001
Household Land Cultivated  0.059 0.014 0.000
Fulltime Farm Labor 
(Number) 0.088 0.048 0.072
Most Education(years) 0.016 0.016 0.327
Having 1-4 adopters 0.404
** 0.199 0.033
Having 5-8 adopters   0.674
*** 0.169 0.001
Having more than 8 
adopters 0.625
** 0.248 0.034
Harresawe   0.454
*** 0.137 0.009
Number of Observations 85
Prob > chi2 0.03
Pseudo R2 0.3427
*=significant at 10%  **=significant at 5%  ***significant at1%Table 8:  Social Network effects on the adoption of fertilizer use
Fertilizer
Odds 
Ratio P>z Coef. P>z
Odds 
Ratio P>z Coef. P>z
Odds 
Ratio P>z Coef. P>z
Friends and Networks Friends only Neighbors only
Male 
Head
(1/0) 1.031 0.96 0.032 0.32 1.0993 0.61 0.052 0.87 1.160 0.79 0.075 0.81
HH
Livestock 1.000 0.48 0.000 0.48 1.0000 0.00 0.000 0.49 1.000 0.35 0.00 0.36
New
Pulse 3.146 0.12 0.714 0.12 3.0132 2.19 0.683 0.13 3.512 0.10 0.78 0.08
New
Cereal 7.693 0.00 1.235 0.00 8.4212 5.00 1.286 0.00 9.236 0.00 1.35 0.00
NewVeg 5.914 0.03 1.042 0.03 6.4155 5.29 1.081 0.02 7.349 0.01 1.16 0.01
Other 
Assets 1.007 0.11 0.004 0.11 1.0006 0.00 0.000 0.12 1.001 0.18 0.0003 0.15
Agehead 






0.024 0.34 0.9632 0.04
-





road(km)  0.999 0.98
-






0.010 0.78 0.9545 0.10
-






(Number) 1.179 0.49 0.082 0.49 1.2389 0.28 0.116 0.36 1.136 0.58 0.0635 0.63
Most 
Educ. 
(years) 1.201 0.02 0.110 0.02 1.1925 0.09 0.106 0.02 1.196 0.02 0.1091 0.01
Friend 
Network 
size 1.027 0.51 0.017 0.50 1.048** 0.03 0.03




Squared 1.006 0.27 0.004 0.27 1.002** 0.00
0.001
** 0.03 - - - -
Neighbor 
network 








0.003 0.71 - - - - 1.001 0.39 0.0005 0.37P1 1.08 0.94 0.060 0.94 1.1731 1.13 0.090 0.87 1.461 0.66 0.2117 0.66
Number 
of Obs. 131 131 131 131 131 131
Prob > 











*=significant at 10%  **=significant at 5%  ***significant at1%
MaleHead(1/0) 1.8376 0.327 0.3512 0.314
Household Non productive assets 1.0007* 0.101 0.0001 0.173
Household Livestock 1.0001 0.220 0.7131 0.122
NewPulse 2.9235 0.158 1.3912*** 0.000
NewCereal 10.876*** 0.001 1.4556*** 0.001
NewVeg 11.189*** 0.003 0.0005* 0.079
Agehead (years) 0.9994 0.974 0.0005 0.962
Distance to closest market(Km) 0.9444 0.193 -0.0341 0.169
Distance to paved road(km)  0.9747 0.234 -0.0136 0.244
Household Land Cultivated  0.9479 0.667 -0.0239 0.671
Fulltime Farm Labor (Number) 1.1046 0.699 0.0559 0.689
Most Education(years) 1.2395*** 0.007 0.1346*** 0.000
Not in a poverty trap 0.3073 0.177 -0.6437 0.167
Friend Network size*Poverty Trap 1.1288 0.391 0.0677 0.399
Friends network size 
squared*Poverty Trap 0.997 0.550 -0.0011 0.582




Friends network size squared*Not 
in Poverty Trap 1.0006* 0.093 0.0002* 0.077
Harresawe 5.809 0.143 0.9307 0.145
Number of Observations 121 121
Prob > chi2
Pseudo R2 0.2859 0.2884
*=significant at 10%  **=significant at 5%  ***significant at1%
Table 9: Differential Social Network effects on the adoption of fertilizer by poverty 
status
Logit estimation 
results Probit estimation results
Fertilizer Odds Ratio P>z Coefficient P>zFigure 1: Network effect of  on the probability of adopting irrigated crops
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Non Parametric results for Irrigated cropsFigure 3: Network effect of  for households in a poverty trap
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